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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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NII 49, Leningrad

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German Contributions at NII 49

1. [ ] the contributions of the German specialists at Institute 49 were, as a whole, of minor importance. The Soviets displayed little interest in the work of the Germans from the very beginning. Many of my German colleagues expressed the same view, and [ ] discussed the matter frequently. [ ] many projects, which the Germans had completed, were never utilized and that others were, for unknown reasons, often suddenly stopped in the middle of development. In addition, the Germans were asked questions, years later, about problems on which they had previously delivered complete technical reports. These reports had obviously just been filed away. 25X1
2. In the radar laboratory sub-department for decimeter range instrumentation at the Institute, where Dr. Wolff [ ] worked from 1946 to the middle of 1949, [ ] the Soviets, in the beginning, were more advanced than the Germans in some respects. The reason for this was that the Soviets had had an opportunity during the war to follow and to learn from British and American developments, whereas [ ] Germans were more or less isolated during these years. However, in the course of the work at NII 49, the Soviets undoubtedly benefited from [ ] 25X1

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development methods and research. Captured German material and German instruments were also of considerable help to the Soviets, especially in the first years. Later, the Soviets copied and manufactured many Western products.

3. In my opinion, the Soviets learned much during the first years about computer reconstruction from the German Mummert group which conducted research in the servo-mechanism laboratory of Institute 49. Previous to this, they had known almost nothing about this field.

Soviet Support at NII 49

4. [ ] the Soviets could have made much better use of the German specialists at Institute 49. Different treatment and different working methods would have produced better results. Less pressure and fewer petty control measures, on the one hand, with more psychological understanding and interest [ ], on the other, would have done a lot to raise the working spirit [ ]. Many times, the Soviets denied support (time, manpower, materials, reference material, consultation, etc.) for improvements on projects which had been proposed by the Germans. 25X1
5. A similar organization with similar development tasks would have been run much more efficiently in Germany. The technical personnel would not only have received every necessary and possible support in material, literature, and personnel, but they would also have been allowed much more independence in working methods and creative thinking. Undoubtedly the results, both qualitative and quantitative, would have been better and faster. [ ] working methods and results in the many other laboratories of the Institute, which were staffed only by Soviet engineers, [ ] their experience was not different [ ]. 25X1  
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6. [ ] the average Soviet engineer and technician to be of lower performance ability than his counterpart in Germany. [ ] with less stress on norms and more independent working methods, Soviet personnel could achieve better results. The methods used at the Institute discouraged individual initiative and independent thinking in general, because it was safer and easier for an employee to conform to the prescribed norms. 25X1  
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7. [ ] the Soviets would not have achieved the same progress in the decimeter and computer fields without the aid of the German specialists. To achieve the same results would have taken them considerably longer, perhaps twice as long. 25X1

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